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Explaining Patterns of Candidate Competition in 
Congressional Elections* 
Jeffrey S. Banks, University of Rochester 
D. Roderick Kiewiet, California Institute of Technology 
The low probability of defeating incumbent members of Congress deters potentially strong 
rivals from challenging them. Yet almost all incumbents are challenged, usually by opponents who 
lack previous experience in office and run underfinanced, ineffectual campaigns. But if strong chal-
lengers are deterred from challenging incumbents, why are not weak challengers, who have even less 
chance of unseating an incumbent? 
The model developed in this paper indicates that there is a simple reason why weak candidates 
choose to run against incumbents: they do so in order to maximize their probability of getting elected 
to Congress. Together with the findings of previous researchers, the results of our analyses of con-
gressional primary data from 1980 through 1984 provide strong support for the major hypotheses 
derived from our model. 
1. Previous Research: The Advantages of Incumbency 
Over the past two decades over 93% of incumbent members of Congress 
who seek reelection have been successful. This high success rate is in large 
measure due to the resources that incumbents possess. First, key institutional 
features of Congress allow incumbents to maximize the political benefits and to 
minimize the political risks entailed in making public policy (Mayhew l 974a). 
The division of legislative labor among dozens of standing committees and hun-
dreds of subcommittees produces specialization of policymaking expertise and 
disaggregation of power. This facilitates the ability of incumbents to take per-
sonal credit for programs and policies that benefit their constituents and so boosts 
their reelection prospects. Second, the single-member district electoral system 
grants each incumbent a corner on the local market for "constituency service" 
or "case work" (Fiorina 1977, 1979). Representatives have voted themselves 
large staffs and office budgets in order to provide such services to their constitu-
ents. Third, incumbents can exploit the franking privilege to mail constituents 
large volumes of educational material, including vital information about what 
they have been doing for them lately (Cover 1978; Cover and Bromberg 1982). 
Incumbents also enjoy ready access to local mass media and thus a level of public 
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Year 
1972 
1974 
1976 
1978 
1980 
1982 
1984 
Jeffrey S. Banks and D. Roderick Kiewiet 
TABLE l 
Nonincumbent Candidates in Congressional General Elections with 
Experience in Elective Office, 1972-84 
(In Percentages) 
Incumbent Running Open Seat 
Dem. Rep. Dem. 
21.5 21.7 41.4 
38.3 12.6 54.7 
29.5 16.9 60.0 
25.4 16.2 50.0 
25.4 14.6 62.2 
39.l 15.4 73.6 
19.4 13. l 60.9 
Rep. 
51.7 
49.l 
59.0 
44.2 
51.4 
62.3 
60.9 
SOURCE: The 1972-78 figures are from Jacobson and Kernell (1981, 32). Figures for 1980-84 are 
derived from data the authors obtained from Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report's coverage of 
congressional primary election. 
exposure and awareness that nonincumbent candidates can only covet (Mann 
1978; Mann and Wolfinger 1980). 
As if this is not enough, the strategic environment of congressional elec-
tions appears to play to the incumbents' advantage. A large body of research 
indicates that incumbents do not usually face a strong challenger of the other 
party in the general election (Leuthold 1968; Huckshorn and Spencer 1971; 
Mann and Wolfinger 1980; Jacobson 1980a, 1980b). The most systematic evi-
dence on this phenomenon is that reported by Jacobson and Kernell ( 1981). Their 
data indicate that men and women who have held a prior elective office (e.g., a 
seat in the state legislature) perform several percentage points better in con-
tests against incumbent members of Congress than do challengers who lack such 
previous experience. Presumably, previous experience in office makes them 
stronger candidates by providing them with a higher degree of visibility, credi-
bility, and thus more access to campaign contributions. High-quality candidates 
with previous experience in elected office, however, are far more likely to be 
found vying for an open seat than challenging an incumbent. This is shown by 
the figures in Table 1. 
The relatively large percentages of Democratic challengers in 1974 and 
1982 who had previously held an elected office indicates that inauspicious 
years spawn a larger number of strong challenges against incumbents of the 
president's party. Multivariable analyses of House races also have found that 
several indicators of incumbent vulnerability (poor economic conditions when 
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the incumbent president is of the same party, a small victory margin in the 
previous election, or strong underlying support in the district for the opposite 
party) predict challenges by previously experienced, higher-quality candidates 
(Bianco 1984; Bond, Covington, and Fleisher 1985). Similarly, incumbents who 
have cast unpopular votes (e.g., against declaring war in 1941 or against im-
peaching Nixon in 1974) can expect strong, well-funded opponents (Wright 
1977; Mann 1978). 
The obvious implication of Table 1, however, is that unless an incumbent is 
particularly vulnerable, potentially strong challengers prefer to wait on the side-
lines until he dies, retires, or otherwise decides not to run for reelection. This 
implication is in fact so obvious that the full extent of such self-selection is 
documented for the first time in Table 2. In addition to strong challengers (those 
who had previously held an elected office) and weak challengers (those with no 
TABLE 2 
Rates of Participation by Different Types of Candidates in 
Congressional Primary Elections, 1980-84 
Democrats 
Challenger Strength 
Type of Primary High Medium Low All 
Democratic incumbent 7• 1 38 42 
(0.09)b (0.01) (0.54) (0.65) 
Republican incumbent 28 6 80 92 
(0.34) (0.08) (1.40) (1.81) 
Open seat 67 30 75 100 
( 1.26) (0.34) (1.70) (3.30) 
Republicans 
Republican incumbent 2 1 14 17 
(0.03) (0.01) (0.16) (0.20) 
Democratic incumbent 14 7 73 82 
(0.15) (0.07) ( 1.13) (1.36) 
Open seat 58 15 84 100 
(0.96) (0.16) (I. 98) (3.11) 
N 
695 
417 
113 
421 
691 
113 
Norn: •The upper figure in each entry indicates the percentage of elections in which at least one 
candidate of the type indicated was running. 
bThe number in parentheses is the average number of candidates of the type indicated in each type of 
primary election. 
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previous political experience), we also assigned challengers to a "medium" 
strength category. Such candidates had either been congressional staffers, party 
officials, or had previously held a nonelected public office. 
The figures in Table 2 bear out the intuitive interpretation of Table l. The 
reason why incumbents generally do not face strong challengers is that under 
these circumstances such challengers choose not to run for their party's nomina-
tion in the first place. Weaker candidates demonstrate far less aversion to doing 
so. Indeed, at least one weak challenger showed up more often to challenge a 
Republican incumbent (80%) than to contest an open seat (75%). Open seats, 
however, attracted a slightly higher average number of weak Democratic chal-
lengers (I. 70 compared to 1.40). Challengers in this category were far more 
likely to take on an incumbent of their own party as well. 
That potentially strong challengers should prefer to hold off running until 
the seat opens up is understandable enough. Such a contest promises to be a 
battle fought on roughly equal footing with an opponent similar to oneself in 
resources and experience. The odds of winning such a race are much higher, 
making a run at an open seat more appealing than the bleak prospects of unseat-
ing an incumbent. Most of the time, the opponent that an incumbent faces is 
instead an obscure figure who has never previously held an elected office. Thus 
while potentially stronger candidates are discouraged from running by the odds 
against unseating an incumbent, unknown and inexperienced challengers enter 
the fray, usually launching themselves, as Maisel ( 1982) puts it, from obscurity 
to oblivion. This pattern of competition, however, is a puzzling one. Formal 
models of competition as well as common sense indicate that weak opponents 
are deterred more readily than strong ones. Here, however, strong challengers 
are deterred from challenging incumbents while the weak are not. How can 
this be? 
Previous research has suggested several answers to this question. These are 
probably best illuminated in terms of the conventional equation of political 
participation, 
R = pB - C + D 
in which R, the utility of engaging in a political act (e.g., voting, running for 
office) equals the benefits (B) accruing from the act-in this case the benefits of 
election to Congress-times the probability (p) that the act will yield the bene-
fits, minus the costs ( C) of engaging in the act, plus the private consumption 
value (D) of the act (Riker and Ordeshook 1973). 
Most previous studies have relied heavily upon the existence of a large D 
(private consumption) term to account for the greater willingness of weak chal-
lengers to take on incumbents. Many report that they knew they would almost 
surely lose such a race but ran in order to pursue other, nonelectoral goals. Other 
candidates claim to have taken on a hopeless campaign against an incumbent out 
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of a sense of duty to their party; although they themselves had little chance of 
winning, they felt that they would aid the party's candidates for other offices who 
would otherwise be "pulled down" by the absence of a congressional candidate 
on the ballot (Kazee 1980). 
Other explanations appeal to additional types of consumption. Candidates 
report that their campaign served as an excellent forum to present their views on 
major issues (Maisel 1982) or that running for office was a personally enriching 
experience (Kazee 1980). Yet another explanation is that a congressional cam-
paign against an incumbent, though unsuccessful, yields material benefits such 
as publicity for one's legal practice (Leuthold 1968; Schlesinger 1966; Huck-
shorn and Spencer 1971, O'Neill 1987). 1 
We concur that the D (consumption) term must loom large in the decision 
to run or not. Something has to separate the tiny handful of people who ever 
decided to run for Congress from the rest of us who have never given a thought 
to undertaking such an enterprise. But the sheer consumption value of running 
for office, no matter how high it gets, gives us no leverage in explaining the 
paradoxical pattern of weak candidates challenging incumbents while the strong 
are deterred. This would require additionally that weak candidates derive more 
consumption out of running than do potentially strong candidates. This seems 
dubious at best, given that potentially strong candidates, most notably those who 
have held previous elective office, are strong precisely because they have already 
chosen to devote a substantial part of their life to public affairs. 
A more fruitful line of reasoning is that of Jacobson and Kernell, who argue 
that candidates with no previous office can be induced to challenge incumbents 
because they, unlike many potentially more formidable candidates, do not have 
to forfeit an office they presently hold to make a run for Congress. Furthermore, 
a defeat at the polls for someone at this stage of their political career is a dam-
aging event from which it is very difficult to recover. Weak candidates, in other 
words, have a lower C term in that they face lower opportunity costs. 2 However, 
differential opportunity costs alone do not satisfactorily account for the para-
doxical pattern of congressional competition that we are interested in explaining. 
Strong potential challengers who must forfeit an office they currently hold in 
1 Many suspect that Maisel made his unsuccessful bid for Congress in order to write a book 
about it. Maisel steadfastly denies this charge. 
2 Almost all of the 5,501 state representatives in the United States serve two-year terms and 
therefore must forfeit their seats to run for Congress. But a large majority of state senators serve 
four-year terms and technically could, in every other election year, run for Congress while retaining 
their seats. There are only 1,981 state senators in the country, however, so Jacobson and Kernell are 
correct in observing that most state legislators must forfeit their seat to run for Congress . (These data 
are reported in The Book of the States) . It is also the case that high opportunity costs may dissuade 
challengers from running for Congress even under the most favorable of circumstances. Fowler and 
McClure ( 1989) found that certain members of the New York state legislature chose to hold onto their 
current jobs rather than to run for an open congressional seat that they had a good chance of winning. 
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order to run for Congress must do so regardless of whether they are running for 
an open seat or challenging an incumbent. Similarly, the opportunity costs faced 
by weak candidates, even if they are relatively lower, presumably are not affected 
by the nature of the congressional race they choose to enter. 
Indeed, even if all challengers face the same opportunity costs, and even if 
this cost is zero, another element in the decision calculus-the p (probability) 
tefll}-Will lead different types of candidates to behave differently. For strong 
candidates a consideration of the relevant probabilities generally leads to an ob-
vious course of action; knowing they are far more likely to win an open seat than 
to defeat an incumbent, they will be inclined to wait for the incumbent to step 
aside. Previous research has suggested that weak candidates who challenge in-
cumbents, on the other hand, have deluded themselves into wishfully thinking 
that their probability of winning is much higher than it actually is (Leuthold 
1968; Kazee 1980; Maisel 1982). Perhaps this is so. What we shall show, how-
ever, is that under certain circumstances weak challengers making accurate, un-
biased probability estimates will choose to run against incumbents for the same 
reason strong challengers decide to wait for an open seat-to maximize the 
probability of their being elected to Congress. 
Before proceeding, we would like to reiterate that the purpose of our analy-
sis is not to denigrate the role that costs and private consumption considerations 
play in candidates' decisions to run or not to run. They clearly are very impor-
tant. We believe, however, that all candidates, strong and weak, also condition 
their decisions upon accurate assessments of the odds they face in getting elected 
to Congress. It is these probability assessments, furthermore, that account for 
the paradoxical pattern of congressional competition. Specifically, rational, 
utility-maximizing candidates can generate an equilibrium in which weak candi-
dates challenge incumbents while strong candidates wait for an open seat. 
The key to understanding why this may be the case is the fact that to get to 
Congress candidates must do more than win the general election in their district. 
They must first defeat any and all other opponents from their own party in the 
primary election. For little~known candidates who have never previously held an 
elected office, the inclusion of both these parameters into the decision calculus 
may lead to a higher expected utility from running against an incumbent rather 
than waiting for an open seat. We will now sketch out a simple perfect informa-
tion model involving an incumbent and two potential challengers, one weak and 
one strong, to illuminate this argument. 
2. A Simple Model of Congressional Election Competition 
For the following model, we shall assume that there exist two potential 
challengers, C, and C2 of the same party, and an incumbent C1 of an opposing 
party. Candidates C,, C2 , and C1 are assumed to be risk neutral, and it is known 
with certainty that C1 will retire after one more term in office. At time t = l, 
both C, and C2 decide whether to enter a campaign against the incumbent, while 
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at t = 2, they decide whether to run for the open seat. To operationalize the 
notion of "strong" and "weak" opponents, we let challenger C; possess a quality 
level q;, where q; is a function of C;'s currently held office, previous political 
and electoral experience, and so forth. Let q2 > q1 , where a higher quality level 
indicates a higher probability of defeating the incumbent, ceteris paribus. We 
also assume that (1) each challenger can run in only one general election,3 and 
(2) if either challenger wins at t = l, the other will not challenge their incum-
bency at t = 2. 
At the time of the first entry decision, the outcome of the general election 
is uncertain; however, we can assume that the outcome will be a function of the 
quality of the challenger, q;, and a number of incumbent-specific parameters 
such as C/s voting record R, C/s district-wide exposure A, and C,'s amount of 
casework W. These parameters can be represented by a vector y = (y 1 , y2 , y3 ) 
in R~, where y1 = R, y2 = A, y3 = W. Let ()be a random variable with 
distribution H(()), which describes the randomness of the electoral outcome. The 
plurality for C;, conditional on entry and winning the primary, is 
(l) 
where Vj, is the percentage vote for j at time t. We can suppress ()and treat xii 
as a random variable with distribution F(x;1 ; q;, y), where, given H(()), F(·) is 
the distribution induced by the relationship X; 1 = X; 1((), q;, y). The support of 
F( ·) is [ - l, l], since X; 1 is a plurality vote, and setting 
P;1 (q;, y) = l - F(O; q;, y) (2) 
we have that Pil (q;, y) is the probability that C; defeats the incumbent at t = l. 
Similarly, let p; 2 be the probability that C; defeats the expected candidate in the 
general election at t = 2, conditional on entry and winning the primary. 
We assume that both challengers have a higher probability of winning the 
open seat at t = 2 than the incumbent-occupied seat at t = l: 
apil 
Pil < P;z, - < 0, i = l, 2, 
ay 
(3) 
and that at both t = l and t = 2 the high-quality challenger has a higher proba-
bility of winning the general election: 
apu > o t = l, 2 
aq; , (4) 
Similarly, we can derive the probability 7T2 (q 1 , q2 ) of C2 prevailing in a 
primary contested by C1 , where we assume that 
3 For the sake of convenience, we allow the possibility for a challenger who lost a primary at 
t = I to run again at t = 2. The restriction that candidates may suffer only one general election 
defeat, however, serves to inform the prior decision as to whether or not to enter the primary. 
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a7T2 a7T2 
- < 0, - > 0, 7T2 E (.5, 1) aq, aq2 (5) 
We assume that challenger i has preferences defined over general election results 
and represented by von Neuman-Morgenstein utilities U'(, UI, U7, correspond-
ing to i winning, losing, and not entering the general election, respectively. For 
the high-quality challenger, C2 , we assume that U':]_ > U~ ~ U~, where without 
loss of generality we set U~ = 0. For the low-quality challenger C,, we assume 
that U'{ > U7 = U~, where again we set U7 = 0. Hence, the opportunity cost 
of running in the general election is zero for C, (except at t = 1, where this 
precludes running at t = 2) and is nonnegative for C2 , so that it is possible that 
neither challenger suffers a loss in utility from running in a general election.4 
If C; wins the primary at time t, he or she receives an expected utility at 
time t of 
(6) 
We assume that a.; 2 > 0, i = 1, 2, so that both challengers will run at t = 2 if 
they did not lose the t = 1 general election. This allows us to focus attention on 
the decision of whether or not to run at t = 1. In particular we wish to generate 
conditions under which C, entering and C2 not entering constitute Nash equilib-
rium behavior. 
If C, enters at t = 1, C2 will not enter if 
(7) 
Any necessary condition for equation (7) to hold would require knowledge about 
the values of U':]_, UL U~; however, we can generate sufficient conditions for 
equation (7) using only p" , p21 , and p22 • Expanding out equation (7) and rear-
ranging terms, we get 
(8) 
Since U~ ,;;; 0 and U':J. - U~ > 0, a sufficient condition for equation (8) to hold 
is that 
(9) 
Note that this condition is not a function of 7T2 • For example, suppose that p22 = 
.5 and p21 = .3; since p 11 < p21 , ( 1 - p 11 ) > . 7, so that equation (9) holds, and 
C2 has an incentive to wait, regardless of the utility or the probability 7T2 of 
prevailing in the primary. Applying the same logic, we also see that equation 
(9) and 
•subsequent results hold if u~ is sufficiently close to u':' or if u', > u7' so that c, actually 
gains from the experience. Otherwise the conditions will be a function of the utility levels. 
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7r2P22 > P21 (10) 
imply that it is a dominant strategy for C2 to wait until t = 2 to enter the race. 
Given that C2 does not enter at t = l, C1 will enter if 
(11) 
or 
(12) 
Thus, equations (9) and (12) provide sufficient conditions for C1 to be the 
sole challenger against the incumbent at t = l. Of course, since we have not 
specified any of the parameters in the model, it may be that the quality levels of 
C1 and C2 are sufficiently close to generate another Nash equilibria where only 
C2 enters at t = l. However, when equations (9) and (10) are satisfied, the only 
challenge to the incumbent at t = l (if there is one) will be from a weak chal-
lenger. Furthermore, by equation (5), this becomes more likely the lower the 
quality of this challenger. It is also apparent from equation (3) that equations (9) 
and (10) are more likely to be satisfied the higher the incumbent's quality. Thus 
higher-quality incumbents are "rewarded" with a higher probability of facing a 
low-quality challenger. 
Suppose now that C1 and C2 are concerned only with the probability of 
being elected rather than with their expected utility. If so, C2 will prefer not to 
run at t = l, given C1 is running at t = l, if 
(13) 
Canceling terms, we see that equation (7) re-creates precisely the condition 
which obtains in equation (9). A similar condition holds for equation (12). In 
other words, C1 entering at t = l and C2 not constitutes a Nash equilibrium 
in this "probability" game. But these strategies will also be a Nash equilibrium 
in the "expected utility" game. This implication underlies the empirical exami-
nation of the model below, for it permits us to make predictions about candidate 
behavior solely upon the basis of estimated probabilities of winning under differ-
ent scenarios. 
First, however, we shall draw out a simple example to illustrate the logic of 
this model. Suppose it is known that a Republican incumbent will serve one more 
term before retiring. In the Democratic ranks, there are two potential challeng-
ers. The first is a state senator whose district largely coincides with the congres-
sional district; the second, an attorney who has never campaigned for nor been 
elected to public office. Assume the probability of the lawyer defeating the in-
cumbent is the average success rate weak candidates running against incumbents 
have had over the past decade-5%-while the state senator has a 13% chance 
of dumping the incumbent. Assume also that, having won the primary, the state 
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TABLE 3 
A Game between Two Challengers of the Same Party: 
Summary of Hypothetical Probabilities 
A B c AXBXC 
Probability of S getting elected if: 
S runs now, W runs now .90 .13 1.00 .117 
S runs now, W runs next time 1.00 .13 1.00 .130 
S runs next time, W runs now 1.00 .43 .95 .409 
S runs next time, W runs next time .90 .43 1.00 .387 
Probability of W getting elected if: 
W runs now, S runs now .lO .05 1.00 .005 
W runs now, S runs next time 1.00 .05 1.00 .050 
W runs next time, S runs now 1.00 .24 .87 .209 
W runs next time, S runs next time .10 .24 1.00 .024 
NoTE: A = probability of winning the primary. 
B =probability of winning the general election. 
C = probability that the incumbent was not previously defeated. 
senator would have a 43% chance of winning an open seat in this district, com-
pared to 24% for the lawyer.5 Although the lawyer would have only a small 
(10%) chance of defeating the state senator in a Democratic primary, both can-
didates would be certain to win if they ran unopposed. Both know that if one 
waits for the open seat and the other does not, there is a chance that the other 
will defeat the incumbent. If this happens, the candidate who waited will be 
precluded from running in the second election against the new incumbent of his 
own party. The opportunity costs and consumption benefits for both challengers 
are the same whether they run now or run later, and so we shall ignore them for 
present purposes. We assume only that the net costs and consumption benefits 
for both do not rule out a run for Congress entirely. 
These probabilities are summarized in Table 3. The term S refers to the 
strong challenger (the state senator); W, to the weak challenger (the lawyer); A 
is the probability of winning the primary; B, the probability of winning the gen-
eral election; and C, the probability that the incumbent was not previously de-
feated by the other challenger. 
5The probabilities used in this example were calculated by Gary Jacobson (personal commu-
nication) in a probit analysis of 1970-84 congressional election data in which he assumed neutral 
national tides and the presence of an incumbent who received 65% of the vote in the previous 
election. We are indebted to him for.making these figures available to us. 
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As indicated above we can describe the payoffs to this game simply in terms 
of the product of probabilities A x B x C. These are reported in Figure l. 
The first payoff listed in each cell is for the strong challenger; the second, for 
the weak. 
In this example the strong challenger has a dominant strategy: wait to run 
for the open seat. Regardless of what the weak challenger does, the strong chal-
lenger's probability of getting elected is higher than if he or she were to run now. 
Because of the slim chance of winning a contested primary, the weak challeng-
er's best strategy is to run whenever the strong challenger is not running and 
thus sail through the primary unopposed. The weak challenger would of course 
prefer the strong challenger to run now against the incumbent, while he or she 
waited to run for the open seat. The young lawyer knows, however, that the 
strong challenger will wait for the open seat regardless of what he or she does. 
To some it may seem implausible (or at least ironic) to develop a rational 
choice model in which weak challengers bother to run at all given their low 
probability of success. Maybe so, but the probabilities assumed in this example 
were derived from the actual record of the past several years. We thus know the 
odds are favorable enough to provoke a challenge in nearly every congressional 
election. Our model simply holds that weak challengers can maximize their 
probability of getting to Congress by running now against the incumbent. This 
probability may not be very high, but they are maximizing it. 
It should also be noted that in the simple strategic environment portrayed 
by our model there can be several strong potential challengers present before any 
of them have an incentive to run against the incumbent. Assume, for example, 
that there are three candidates with the same general election prospects as the 
strong challenger here (a 13%" chance of defeating the incumbent, a 43% chance 
of taking the open seat) and that each has a 33% chance of winning a primary in 
which they all participated. Each would still have a higher probability of getting 
to Congress by waiting for the open seat than by challenging the incumbent. 
FIGURE I 
Payoff Matrix of the Game between Two Challengers 
Strong 
Challenger 
Run Now vs. 
Incumbent 
Run Next Time 
for Open Seat 
Weak 
Challenger 
Run Now vs. 
Incumbent 
Run Next Time 
for Open Seat 
11.7%, 0.5% 13.0%, 20.9% 
40.9%, 5.0% 38.7%, 2.4% 
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4. Empirical Examination of the Model 
According to the model we have developed, the paradoxical pattern of 
strong candidates being deterred by the presence of an incumbent from the other 
party, while weak candidates are not, is actually a product of their utility-
maximizing decisions. No matter what the weak challenger does, the strong chal-
lenger is better off waiting for the open seat. Knowing that waiting gives little 
chance of beating the strong challenger in a primary, the weak challenger runs 
now, confident that he or she can at least get the nomination and thus the outside 
chance it confers at toppling the incumbent. 
There are a couple of things which should be kept in mind in evaluating the 
empirical performance of our model. First, the model gives only the conditions 
under which it makes sense for weak candidates to challenge incumbents while 
the strong do not. Other conditions will dictate other strategies. The point of our 
empirical analysis, then, is to determine whether or not weak candidates typi-
cally do face circumstances similar to those given in equations (9) and (12)-
circumstances which will induce them to run against an incumbent rather than 
wait for an open seat. If so, we shall have an explanation for the paradoxical 
pattern of congressional election competition. Second, it should also be kept in 
mind that previous experience in elected office is a coarse measure of candidate 
quality. Many state legislators are not very formidable candidates for Congress, 
and many candidates who have never held office possess other resources that 
make them high-quality candidates. 6 Personal wealth can obviate the hazards of 
fund-raising, and there are many careers outside of politics which produce a high 
level of visibility-sports, space flight, television, and selling cars, to name 
a few. 7 
As was shown in the previous section, our analysis can proceed by consid-
ering only the probability terms that guide candidates' decisions. The record of 
the last several years indicates that the probability of an incumbent falling to a 
challenger with no previous experience in office is only about 5%. If so, the 
weak challenger's rationale for accepting these odds depends crucially upon the 
premise that the odds of beating a strong challenger in the party's primary are 
6 lt might seem that we could examine the implications of our model directly by categorizing 
challengers as weak or strong on the basis of previous elected office and then comparing their rates 
of success in contests against incumbents versus elections to an open seat. This would simply require 
computing the conditional probability terms listed in Table 3. Such a procedure, however, would be 
invalidated by the self-selection predicted by our model. Candidates with experience in elected office 
who nevertheless challenge incumbents are the weakest of the strong. Candidates with no previous 
experience in office who run for open seats would correspondingly be the strongest of the weak. 
7 Actually television exposure is no guarantee of electoral success in the congressional arena. 
Fred Grandy was able to parlay his previous career (playing Gopher on The Love Boat) into a victory 
in Iowa's Sixth District in 1986. However, Nancy Kulp (Miss Jane Hathaway on The Beverly Hill-
billies) was trounced in her run for Pennsylvania's Ninth District seat in 1984. 
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also extremely unfavorable. The first task in gauging the empirical merits of our 
model is thus to determine just how successful weak candidates have been in 
primary contests against strong candidates. To make this calculation, we again 
turned to the data we gathered from the Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. 
From their coverage of congressional nomination contests between 1980 and 
1984, we were able to obtain the requisite data on 1,225 pairs of congressional 
nomination contests (almost all were primaries, but a few states still use state 
conventions) for a total of 2,450 observations. This represents 94% of the con-
gressional primary contests held in these three years. 
Table 4 reports the percentages of weak challengers who managed to win 
their party's nomination despite the fact that it also was being sought by at least 
one strong challenger. As before, individuals with a prior elected office on their 
resume are considered strong. Those without one are considered weak. As these 
figures indicate, weak challengers were seldom able to prevail in the face of 
competition from strong challengers. This happened in only 11.2% of such cases 
in our data set-a figure very close to the hypothetical probability of 10% used 
in our illustrative sample. Nor did it seem to matter much whether the candidates 
were Democrats or Republicans or whether the winner would go on to face an 
incumbent or to vie for an open seat. 
Furthermore, our model implies that the 11.2% success rate that we calcu-
lated from these data is misleadingly high. This is because the presence of one 
or more strong candidates in a contest should have deterred some weak candi-
dates from entering. Our model implies that relatively weak candidates who de-
cided to run under such circumstances should have higher quality levels than 
those who did not. The challengers in our weak category, then, would be the 
strongest of the weak. 
Having determined that it would make abundant good sense for weak chal-
lengers to avoid primary contests against stronger opponents, the task to which 
we now turn is to determine if they in fact do so. According to our model, the 
greater willingness of weak challengers to run against incumbent representatives 
derives from a desire to avoid being pitted against one or more strong challengers 
TABLE 4 
Weak Challengers Who Win Congressional Primaries When Opposed 
by One or More Strong Challengers, 1980-84 
(In Percentages) 
Type of Primary Democrats Republicans 
Challenge of an incumbent 
Open seat 
12.7 
10.2 
16.0 
7.6 
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in the primary. If so, we should observe that weak candidates are less likely to 
enter primary elections that are also being contested by strong candidates. This 
hypothesis constitutes a critical test for our model. 
Results of this test are reported in Table 5. These figures reveal clear evi-
dence of the hypothesized deterrent effect. Weak challengers of both parties were 
much more likely to appear in primaries when strong challengers were absent. 
This is true when the primary winner went on to face an incumbent of the other 
party, as well as when the seat was open. The only comparison that failed to bear 
out this prediction was that involving the average number of weak Republican 
candidates in open seats. All other comparisons were in the predicted direction 
and significant at the .05 level or better. The paradoxical pattern of self-selection 
in which strong candidates are deterred by incumbents while the weak are not 
can thus be accounted for by a prior, more readily understood pattern of self-
selection in which weak candidates are deterred by strong candidates of their 
own party. 
An additional observation worth making here is that strong candidates failed 
to enter a surprisingly large number (over a third) of the open seat primaries in 
TABLE 5 
The Effect of the Presence of Strong Candidates upon the Number of Weak Candidates 
in Congressional Primary Elections, 1980-84 
Democrats 
Strong Challenger Present 
Type of Primary Yes No Combined N 
Challenge of an incumbent 58• 89 80 417 
(l.Ol)b ( 1.54) (1.40) 
Open Seat 66 95 75 113 
(1.55) (2.00) (I. 70) 
Republicans 
Challenge of an incumbent 47 77 73 691 
(0.82) ( 1.18) (1.13) 
Open Seat 73 100 84 113 
(1.98) (2.00) (I. 98) 
NOTE: •The upper figure in each entry indicates the percentage of elections in which at least one weak 
candidate was running. 
hThe number in parentheses is the average number of weak candidates in each type of primary 
election. 
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TABLE 6 
Previous Experience of Candidates Elected to the House, 1970-84: 
Challenges of Incumbents Compared to Open Seat Elections 
Type of Election 
Political Background Incumbent Running Open Seat N 
State office 25.3 74.7 265 
City or county office 39.1 60.9 87 
Appointed public position 66.6 33.3 15 
Congressional staffer 13.6 86.4 22 
Former representative 60.0 40.0 20 
Party official 42.9 57.1 28 
No previous office 56.6 43.4 113 
our sample. Conversely, these contests attracted large numbers of weak candi-
dates. We suspect there are a couple of factors that largely account for this. First, 
not every open seat portends an evenly matched contest between the two parties' 
nominees. In an overwhelmingly Democratic district, for example, the Republi-
can nomination is not worth much even when there is no incumbent running. 
Consequently, the Republican primary will not attract strong candidates, assum-
ing that a strong Republican candidate even exists. Second, in some elections 
the incumbent, due to death, illness, or other reasons, drops out unexpectedly 
after primary filing dates have passed. But because potentially strong challengers 
had expected the incumbent to run and had thus chosen not to run themselves, a 
weak challenger is able to win the primary and therefore to run for an open seat. 
The pattern of candidate competition that we have so far analyzed has im-
portant consequences for the nature of the candidates who are ultimately elected 
to Congress and for the paths they followed to get there. Table 6 displays data 
on the backgrounds of the 550 members elected to their first term in the House 
of Representatives between 1970 and 1984. Because of the larger number of 
observations possible, we are able to break these data down into finer categories 
than the dichotomy based upon whether or not the candidate had previously held 
an elected office. These figures show that nearly 75% of the successful House 
candidates who had previously held state-level office got to Congress by winning 
an open seat. Former staffers were also more likely to have chosen the strategy 
of running for an open seat-usually the one vacated by their boss. 
The less impressive their previous office, however, the more likely candi-
dates were to have been elected to Congress by not waiting for an open seat. 
County or city officeholders were more likely to have done so than state office-
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TABLE 7 
Previous Congressional Election Losses Suffered by 
Candidates Elected to the House, 1970-84 
Political Background 
State office 
City or county office 
Minor office 
Yes 
Previous 
Congressional 
Election Loss 
8.6 
9.0 
20.0 
No 
91.4 
91.0 
80.0 
Congressional staffer 0.0 100.0 
Former representative 40.0 60.0 
Party official 24.l 75.9 
No previous office 25.4 74.6 
Average for all candidates 14.0 86.0 
holders, and a large majority of those who had only held either a minor office or 
no office at all won their seat by defeating an incumbent. Finally Table 6 reveals 
that for over 20% of all members initially elected to Congress in this period, this 
was the first office to which they had ever been elected. A large majority of these 
members, furthermore, got there by defeating an incumbent. 
There is one additional issue in the congressional election literature that we 
have so far addressed only in passing. Many candidates who have been elected 
to Congress in recent decades had made an unsuccessful attempt before succeed-
ing (Fenno 1978). This suggests that it is possible for an inexperienced chal-
lenger to enhance future political prospects by running a losing but impressively 
strong race against an incumbent (Huckshorn and Spencer 1971). Or, in terms 
of our model, a weak candidate, by doing much better than expected against an 
incumbent, can transform him- or herself into a higher-quality candidate, thereby 
setting the stage for a successful challenge next time. 8 Even better, a strong 
'Strong challengers, of course, are simply those candidates who have improved their quality 
level by climbing the political ladder fewer rungs at a time (e.g., first, city council, then the state 
house, then, they hope, Congress). The probability of becoming a strong challenger via this route is 
thus the probability of winning a series of lesser offices. The probability of eventually getting to 
Congress may be h.igher this way, but it takes longer and requires serving in positions less prestigious 
and rewarding than that of congressional representative. Candidates whose first try for elected office 
is for Congress are apparently more risk acceptant and/or more ambitious; Rohde (1979) found that 
members who first got to Congress by challenging and defeating an incumbent are more likely to try 
subsequently for a seat in the Senate. 
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challenge may persuade the incumbent that the office is not worth another costly 
fight which might end in embarrassing defeat and that retirement is preferable. 
In this case the formerly weak challenger will be in an excellent position to win 
the open seat (Squire and Smith 1984). 
Our data shed some light on this issue as well. As the figures in Table 7 
indicate, less than 10% of the ultimately successful House candidates who had 
previously held state, county, or city office had also sustained a prior defeat in a 
congressional election. In contrast, about one fourth of those in the weakest two 
categories (those who had held only a minor office or no office at all) built a 
successful campaign upon a previous defeat. These data also revealed that in 
nine instances candidates from the weakest two categories won an open seat after 
an earlier loss to an incumbent. Their margins of defeat were quite small-eight 
of the nine had garnered more than 45% of the vote. Although redistricting was 
a proximate cause for the retirement of several incumbents, this evidence indi-
cates to us that the strong challenges they had experienced also encouraged them 
to retire. Initially weak challengers thus appear to be able to improve their quality 
by coming close to knocking off an incumbent, which of course makes the 
strategy of challenging an incumbent rather than waiting for an open seat even 
more attractive. 
5. Conclusion 
Previous research has suggested several reasons why weak candidates chal-
lenge incumbent members of Congress when potentially stronger candidates are 
deterred. It is argued that such candidates misperceive the odds against them or 
that they are actually using a congressional campaign to pursue goals other than 
winning office. Another possibility is that weak candidates may be induced to 
run at lower probabilities of winning because their political opportunity costs are 
low or because a stronger than expected showing may serve as an investment in 
future campaigns. 
All of the above reasons surely contribute to the decisions of unknown, 
inexperienced candidates to run for Congress, but provide little insight as to why 
such candidates should choose to run against incumbents when potentially much 
stronger challengers are deterred. This paper has argued that given the strategic 
situation they face , challenging an incumbent may maximize the probability of 
their being elected to Congress. This is because the current incumbent is not the 
only opponent potential that challengers must take into account. To get to Con-
gress, they must first defeat any and all other candidates of their own party. The 
likelihood of defeating an incumbent representative is low, but a candidate who 
chooses to challenge an incumbent is more likely to avoid serious opposition in 
the primary. A candidate who instead waits for a seat to open up faces the addi-
tional hurdle of winning a primary against one or more strong candidates of his 
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own party. For unknown, inexperienced candidates, the prospects of getting to 
Congress may be better in the former situation than in the latter. 
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